During the 1990s and more so after the turn of the century, the authorities and the public in Scandinavia have become increasingly concerned about the pressure on welfare inflicted by the immigration of people with low skill levels from countries in the South. A large proportion of these newcomers have proven difficult to integrate in the Scandinavian labour market, which is characterised by high demands for skills and a compressed wage structure that makes lowskilled labour comparatively expensive. The universalistic welfare approach, implying a generous inclusion of legal newcomers from day one, in combination with the highly regulated and knowledge-intensive labour market has made the three states, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, particularly exposed to disincentive challenges as concerns the absorption of immigrants in gainful work. This article discusses the current development in the immigration/welfare nexus in the Scandinavian region. It took some years until new academic voices followed up on this basic relation between welfare and immigration, but as we now enter the second decade of the 21st century, the juxtaposition has developed into a core issue in migration research.
from a historical perspective, where we analyse the genesis of the specificities of the welfare/immigration nexus in the Scandinavian region.
Framing the problem
Since Freeman's early take on the relations between the welfare state parameters and the challenge of immigration, the field has expanded in scientific scope. Stretching into the vast citizenship literature, the sphere of interest now also includes questions of cultural rights, identity issues, nationhood and eventually transnationality, but if we try to delineate the relation between immigration and the welfare state institution as such, four tendencies can be distinguished in the academic discourse.
The first analytical position focuses on economic sustainability; generous welfare distribution depends on a restrictive selection of its new members to avoid being overburdened. According to Michael
Walzer, "The idea of distributive justice presupposes a bounded world within which distributions take place: a group of people committed to dividing, exchanging and sharing social goods, first of all among themselves" (Walzer 1983: 31) . Christian Joppke states more bluntly, "Because rights are costly, they cannot be for everybody" (Joppke 1999: 6) . Seyla Benhabib's (2002) concept bounded universalism pinpoints this logic, in which internal redistribution is combined with economically motivated access restrictions.
The second position, which is related to the first, deals with the interconnection between boundaries and bonds -Freeman's "normative consensus": the popular support necessary to sustain the basic structure of a redistributive welfare state in democratic societies. This tendency, in international discourse often labelled as "social cohesion", asserts that increasing ethnic diversity will inevitably weaken the normative consensus, hereby also gradually undermining the foundation of the welfare state. Alesina & Glaeser (2004) and David Goodhart (2004) are frequently cited as belonging in this perspective. Robert Putnam (2007) touches upon much of the same, without explicitly discussing the welfare state.
Another set of scholars have developed a platform from which they argue against, first and foremost, the "social cohesion" approach.
Through international comparative data Banting and Kymlicka, for
example, seek to demonstrate the lack of empirical proof as to the cohesion hypothesis. On the contrary, they argue, it seems that good welfare states themselves cushion the potential negative effects of immigration and diversity. Markus Crepaz (2008) takes this institutional argument a bit further in arguing that institutions can shape the success of integration, indicating that it is up to the welfare stately design to encumber vicious effects of immigration-induced diversity.
In comparing the US and the European context, he makes a point to the effect that when the modest American welfare system was in its infancy, society was already racially divided. In Europe on the other hand, institutionally strong welfare states were already in place when the new comprehensive immigration sparked off. According to Crepaz, this fact has made the European welfare states more robust in withstanding pressure against generalised trust, as the ability to include newcomers as eligible for welfare and care was already established. 1 Finally, in a recent article, Ruud Koopmans (2010) places himself in a position that can be singled out as a fourth approach to the juxtaposition: While the former perspectives focused the sustainability of the welfare state with respect to economy and public support respectively, Koopmans argues that it is unfortunate combinations of welfare and multicultural policies which are unsustainable. Where scholars such as Banting, Kymlicka and Crepaz find evidence that the generous and inclusive welfare state handles immigration better, Koopmans finds that particularly in the welfare states that combine generosity with multicultural policies "which do not provide strong incentives for host-country language acquisition and for interethnic contacts" (ibid: 3) immigrants fare the worst. In this perspective this type of welfare state is bad for the immigrants themselves as "it may lead to dependence on welfare-state arrangements and thereby to social and economic marginalization" (ibid: 2).
Through a comparative analysis he claims that easy access to equal rights, when combined with a generous welfare state, leads to weak labour market participation, high levels of spatial segregation, and overrepresentation in the criminal statistics. Poor socio-economic integration of immigrants is thus blamed on the welfare state and multicultural policies. This (somewhat paternalistic) argument makes welfare generosity towards newcomers not only bad for immigrants, but also bad for society at large.
A Scandinavian point of departure
In the current Scandinavian public discourse on welfare and immigration, all four perspectives are present, although to varying degrees and not necessarily in an explicit manner. During the 1990s and more so after the turn of the century, the authorities and the public have become increasingly concerned about the pressure on welfare inflicted by the immigration of people with low skill levels from countries in the South. A large proportion of these newcomers have proven difficult to integrate in the Scandinavian labour market, which is characterised by high demands for skills and a compressed wage structure that makes low-skilled labour comparatively expensive.
The universalistic welfare approach, implying a generous inclusion of legal newcomers from day one, in combination with the highly regulated and knowledge-intensive labour market has made the three states -Denmark, Sweden and Norway -particularly exposed to disincentive challenges as concerns the absorption of immigrants in gainful work. The specificities of this welfare state/labour market nexus basically premised the restrictive immigration regulation instituted in the early 1970s in the region: Because rights are costly but should be for all, only a few select can be let in. Consequently, the Seen together, these surveys leave the impression that the extension of rights to immigrants in the region has had marginal impact on the ability of the states to swiftly include newcomers in productive work.
The social cohesion approach and its counterpart have increasingly been attended, particularly in Denmark, but also to a certain extent in Norway over the last decade. Cultural conflicts have been connected to welfare state sustainability, and used as fuel for discussion on the limits of solidarity. The broad political support of restrictions both on access to family reunification and citizenship, and on welfare support for newcomers introduced in Denmark in the past decade can be read as an indication of Freeman's theorem: A majority not wanting a welfare system as something for "them" paid by "us". Sweden on the other hand, exemplifies a Crepazian system, trying to use its institutional basis to withstand erosion of welfare state legitimacy for all it is worth.
In this article, the Scandinavian welfare model serves as a common point of departure. By and large, the three countries have subscribed to a very similar institutional welfare approach. The types of immigrants that have entered the respective countries since the 1970s have also been equally uniform: Labour migrants in an early phase and relatively high proportions of humanitarian migrants after the introduction of "immigration stops" in the mid-1970s. The -at least seemingly -significant variation between the countries as far as immigration policy is concerned must therefore be explained through other factors. We will in the following track the three countries' historical trajectories of evolving immigration and immigrant policies from the perspective of the welfare state. Immigration increasingly appeared in the political discourses of these countries as social problems with relevance not only to immigration control regimes but also to social policy. Our ambition here is to give some insight into how the three countries' particular takes on the challenges of immigration and integration have developed historically. In doing this we will not only confirm the existence of divergences, but also problematise them.
The Danish migration scholar Ulf Hedetoft has described the apparent Swedish-Danish divide as one of discursive divergence and practical convergence, and we will see if there is something to this claim (Hedetoft 2006) . This endeavour entails looking at the interaction between the three distinct policy fields: First, immigration control policies regulating terms of entry and newcomers' gradual access to liberal, political, and social rights (citizenship). Second, integration policies that are specifically targeted at managing the incorporation of immigrants into society, for example, language instruction and labour market training. Third, general social policies that are targeted at the overall population, but which also affect immigrants' standards of living -sometimes to a higher extent as many migrants have a more precarious position in the labour market. The solution was a double one: Restrictions on immigration, so as not to "give the problem a bigger extent than what we at any time can deal with" (ibid), and efficient social policies that would ensure that migrants were included in society in a way that did not entail the emergence of new "slums".
While this general assessment of the challenge of immigration as one of avoiding the emergence of new social inequalities appear quite similar in the three countries, we do also in this period see signs of divergence with respect to strategy and policy development.
First, the three countries adopted different approaches to the cultural diversity immigrants represented. Second, they chose different institutional solutions with respect to how they organised the delivery of integration policy.
In all countries the main principle was that immigrants had the same social rights as citizens: Migrants' needs for welfare services should mainly be covered through the ordinary workings of regular welfare state institutions. However, especially in the Swedish political discourse cultural minority issues were high on the agenda, and the dominant view was that special measures had to be put in place in order to take care of migrants' particular needs both as newcomers (Swedish language training, information) and as ethnic and cultural minorities (needs to maintain culture and mother tongue, and enable worship). The multicultural immigrant policy that was formulated by the Swedish parliament in 1974 obliged the welfare state to take care of migrants' special needs, including their right to maintain their own culture as cultural minorities in Sweden, within the framework of the universal welfare state. Equality in this version entailed also equal rights to have one's cultural needs recognised. The freedom of choice -choosing the extent to which one wanted to acculturate or maintain own culture -was held high. Rather than seeing this freedom of choice as a contrast to the highly centralised Swedish system with its unitary standardised welfare solutions, this can be understood as a necessary concession by the social democratic welfare state -by granting culturally diverse groups the freedom to opt out of Swedish homogeneity, the unitary solutions could be maintained (Gür 1996) . The country had then already, in 1969, established a distinct directorate responsible for matters of immigration and integration policy, although in practice immigration control issues far outweighed integration issues in the directorate's daily activities.
Some years later the Norwegian government formulated an immigrant policy that was clearly inspired by the Swedish example, with parts of the white paper closely resembling earlier Swedish formulations. The freedom of choice formulation, for example, was reiterated, but in contrast to Sweden, cultural rights were not given legal form. The need for targeted efforts to achieve real equality is recognised, but responsibility remains within the ordinary welfare apparatus without a distinct organisation such as the Swedish directorate being erected.
In Denmark too, claims for a more developed integration policy were made, but the government's chosen strategy was to offer migrants equal opportunities within the existing system, without recognising any need for targeted measures to satisfy culturally based special needs. Politically the climate was more conflict-laden than in both Sweden and Norway, as Denmark already had an anti-immigrant radical right party, the Progress Party, making explicit claims for higher degrees of assimilation. Quite contrary to this, both
Norway and Sweden were characterised by party political consensus on the need for cultural sensitivity. Conservatives in Sweden even argued -unsuccessfully -for minorities' right to establish separate institutions, such as schools, on the side of the public and unitary welfare system.
From "full" stops to new "flows": humanitarian migration
Most of the debates on integration and the principles of welfare state incorporation of migrants' needs and rights in the 1970s were conducted with labour migrants in mind. Judging from the policy documents of that time, this was a type of immigration policymakers believed could be regulated and controlled according to the needs of the labour market and the capacity of the welfare state. These policies now met the realities of changing migratory trends and movements that were less easy to control. The borders had effectively been closed to labour migrants from the South, but migration continued through family reunification (which was less discussed publicly) and refugee migration -both types of migration that were legitimised with reference to international and humanitarian obligations. All countries saw the numbers of asylum-seekers rise dramatically in the 1980s.
In Norway, for example, only a few hundred asylum-seekers arrived annually in the early 1980s; 8,600 came in 1987. Smaller groups of refugees had been arriving in the three countries throughout the post-war era too, but they had tended to be treated as a phenomenon quite distinct from the labour migration that received the bulk of the political attention. Despite the overall principle that migrant integration was the responsibility of the general welfare state institutions, social work for refugees had in both Norway and Denmark been effectively delegated to nongovernmental organisations with public funding. The two countries' refugee councils had established and for several decades run reception facilities to assist the refugees in their first two years in the country. This included housing facilities, language classes, social workers and labour market advisors. Now, the arrival of refugees and asylum-seekers, their numbers and legitimacy, and their need for services and incorporation into Scandinavian societies, were to dominate the political debates on immigration and integration in next decades. This constituted a massive logistical challenge and, not least, a political one that challenged the legitimacy of the authorities' immigration policies in a way not hitherto seen.
In Norway the rise in asylum-seeker figures paved the way for the electoral breakthrough of the anti-immigrant Progress Party. In the 1987 election the party campaigned not only against asylum immigration as such, but also against the alleged preferential treatment these people received from the welfare state. Special measures and special benefits played a pivotal part in the party's argumentation, construing the migrants as receivers of welfare benefits from which Norwegians were excluded. In the words of the party's charismatic leader, these were funds "that could alternatively have been used to help weak groups like the disabled, hard up elderly and sick people" The dramatic increase in arrival of asylum-seekers brought about a number of practical challenges: Thousands of people needed temporary accommodation for months and years as case backlogs increased and appeals were pending. When positive decisions were eventually made, the (former) asylum-seekers moved into municipalities where they needed housing and in most cases also language training and social assistance until they were able to find work. The growth in numbers also meant that original ambitions about placing refugees in localities where suitable work and education facilities existed had to be abandoned in favour of taking-the-whole-country-into-use type of strategies where refugees were settled where accommodation could be found.
Low employment rates among immigrants with background from non-Western countries became apparent in the 1990s. All countries, although to a lesser extent Norway, experienced growing unemployment rates in the early 1990s, and the migrant populations were hit particularly hard. More extensive surveys on living conditions among the immigrant population were being conducted, and the pictures that emerged pointed to large inequalities between migrants and the native population. "Give me a job" was the telling title of one such study. This first survey of living conditions among refugees in Norway pointed to the lack of work and resultant long-term dependence on social assistance as key obstacles for refugees' integration in Norway (Djuve & Hagen 1995) . At the same time, social policies in general were being scrutinised and reformed to maximise work incentives for the population at large.
To a large extent, the challenges facing policymakers were similar in the three countries: An immigration that due to its humanitarian nature was difficult to control, coupled with low employment rates, and an increasingly visible gap in living conditions between migrants and natives. But there were also differences: in Denmark and Norway radical right parties were able to take advantage of the situation and profit politically on popular scepticism against immigration.
In Sweden, New Democracy only acquired short-term success, thus enabling a lower degree of politicisation and public debate on the issues than in the neighbouring countries. Institutionally, the countries also found different ways to manage the integration process.
In Sweden specialised state institutions were erected at an early stage to take responsibility for the integration of newcomers, Norway followed suit somewhat later; while Denmark until late in the 1990s still maintained the principle of applying the same general solutions for all, with the important exemption of refugee integration which was handled outside of the state apparatus. However, in all countries the overall principle was that migrants had the same formal rights to welfare as every other citizen, the ideal being that the general welfare state should be able to cater to migrants' needs as part of its ordinary activities. Sweden gave up its most radical multicultural ambitions of minority rights to cultural survival in the mid-1980s, thus aligning with the other two's principle of meeting culturally diverse individuals' needs within the universal welfare state model.
The active welfare state
The sense of failure in including migrants both in the labour market and in society at large has grown stronger in all countries in the past two decades. During the 1990s and 2000s the countries have to varying extents reform the initial models in order to handle the challenges of cultural diversity, and more generally to increase employment and reduce dependency of social benefits in the immigrant population. Below we discuss each of the three countries' reforms and continuities separately.
Denmark
Danish authorities, compared to their Scandinavian neighbours, were late in developing an explicit integration policy. When they did, there was a strong focus on integration through the labour market As noted, until 1998 it was an NGO, the Danish Refugee Council, which was responsible for social work for refugees for the first two years of residence. Other migrants received necessary welfare support from the municipalities in which they lived, generally on the same conditions as citizens. There was no directorate or ministry dedicated especially to immigration or integration issues.
In the early 1990s the institutional responsibility for immigration and integration issues was centralised to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
At the same time, a number of reports were published, all pointing to the need to improve migrants' labour market participation to ensure better integration. Both in the media (Hervik 1999) and in academia (Mogensen & Matthiessen 2000) attention was directed at the poor work incentives many migrants faced, as welfare benefits often were fairly generous compared to earnings in the low-skilled jobs migrants typically have been restricted to.
In 1998 the Integration Act was adopted, which substantially increased state control over the settlement and integration of newcomers. The Act included a plan for geographic dispersal of refugees.
Central authorities distributed newcomers to municipalities according to local quotas, and barriers were established on refugees' ability to transport their integration benefits from the municipality where they were initially settled. The responsibility for refugees' integration was transferred from the Danish Refugee Council to municipalities, which were obliged to offer all new non-EU immigrants (not only refugees)
an introductory programme aimed at providing basic qualifications for future employment or education according to individual action plans.
The introductory programmes are extensive, demanding full-time activities for up to three years. Participation in these programmes was linked to the payment of the newly devised "introduction allowance", which was at a level considerably lower than the social assistance cies that formally applied to all residents, but which in practice were targeted at, and primarily affected migrants. Thus Denmark provides an example of a country that has reformed its general social policies in order to tackle issues associated with migrants in particular. The introduction allowance (to people on an introductory programme) was again brought to a level below social assistance, but now in tandem with a "start assistance" which applied to everyone, including Danish citizens, who had lived in the country less than seven out of the past eight years. Forklaedecirkulaeret (the apron directive) meant that in cases where both spouses were on long-term social benefits, one partner's benefit was replaced with a spouse's supplement. The aim was to increase work incentives for families where both spouses were out of work. The underlying suspicion was that in many migrant families, at least one of the spouses would not genuinely be searching for work -in contrast presumably to majority families where the norm is for both spouses to work. Changes in the regulations of child benefits meant that parents who did not follow up on so-called foraeldrepålaeg (parental orders), for example about regular school attendance, could lose their child benefits. Again the intended target group was migrant families who took their children to the countries of origin for extended periods of time.
Citizenship legislation has been reformed in a way that suggests an understanding of naturalisation as a reward for successful integration. Applicants need to be economically self-sufficient, not having received social assistance or integration benefits for more than one out of the past five years. Knowledge of the Danish language must be documented, and the applicant needs to pass a citizenship test with questions about Danish social affairs, history, and culture. A test will also be established for prospective immigrants seeking family reunification in Denmark.
On the other hand, Danish integration policies also provide migrants with rights and opportunities. The strong focus on integration through work has been followed up by extensive targeted programmes in order to provide migrants with the qualifications they need to find work (Djuve & Kavli 2007) . In contrast to both Norway and Sweden, the introductory programmes do not only apply to humanitarian migrants, but also to family migrants (excluding those who have been reunified with an EU/EEA citizen) -thus a wider group is entitled to fairly extensive individually adapted basic training. In addition, Danish language training is formulated as a right for immigrants, and for humanitarian and family migrants it is also free of charge.
Danish political scientist Jørgen Goul Andersen has thus labelled the start assistance an exception, and concludes that the welfare state has remained inclusive to those immigrants who are in the country.
The more radical change concerns the measures established to limit the number of refugees and family migrants arriving in the first place (Andersen 2007).
Norway
The integration regime established in Norway was, despite the existence of a coordinating directorate, comparatively decentralised.
Municipalities were free to decide if and how many refugees they were willing to settle, thus making negotiations between central and local authorities a significant part of the implementation of policy. Municipalities received a set subsidy per settled refugee, thus providing local authorities with an incentive to offer efficient labour market training. If newcomers rapidly moved on from the local social assistance budgets to become self-sufficient, municipalities would be able to make a profit out of settling refugees. 3 Thus there was no legal regulation of the type, extent, and intensity of the training newcomers were to receive, but a financial incentive structure set up to motivate local authorities to provide efficient services. In reality, the quality of the training offered varied considerably. Participation rates were often poor, and the local authorities rarely used the powers they had to sanction non-participation financially by deducting social assistance.
The Introduction Act from 2003 constituted a major leap in centralising control over the implementation of integration policy.
Settlement decisions were still left to the municipalities, but the municipalities that chose to settle refugees were now instructed to offer all newly arrived refugees and their families an introductory programme along similar lines as the Danish programme. Newcomers thus obtained a right to an introductory programme with individual action plans, for up to two years. They also obtained the right to a fixed-rate introduction allowance, as opposed to the means-tested social assistance most newcomers in practice had been dependent on previously. This also meant that unless they found paid work, they had imposed upon them a duty to actively take steps to increase their own employability through programme participation. It is complicated to compare the size of the allowances paid to participants in introductory programmes in Norway and Denmark. However, it was never -as in Denmark -made a point out of, using (reducing) the introduction allowance in order to increase work incentives. The ambition, as stated in policy documents, was to get people off the social assistance system, which was deemed to promote clientification and passivity, and into active qualification; not to make public income support less financially attractive. On the contrary, the transition from means-tested social assistance to a rights-based benefit (although conditional on active participation) was seen as a potential lever to increase the dignity and sense of self-worth among refugees.
In 2005 The new integration policy that was presented in 1997 was heralded as a paradigm shift. The main challenge, as it was now formulated, was to move away from the previous targeting of immigrants as a particular group. It was argued that multiculturalism had been conserving and reinforcing the distinction between "us" and "them", and this had in itself been a driving force behind the marginalisation -utanförskap -migrants and their children suffered from in Swedish society. The solution was to make a distinction between policies targeted at new arrivals, such as introductory programmes, and general policies that had to be aimed at a general population that had diversity as one of its defining characteristics. However, as
Borevi points out, the idea that migrants as far as possible should be part of the same social policy programmes as the population at large was hardly new, but had in fact been a major element in the authorities' approach to migrants in Sweden from the very start of the new immigration.
In fact, introductory programmes for newcomers were already established when the new integration policy was launched in 1997.
Sweden The sense that integration has failed seems to be shared in all countries, and this is a diagnosis that has led to policy change. In this sense, Scandinavian politicians seem to be more pessimistic than Banting and Kymlicka's analysis suggests that they should be.
On the other hand, these authors' optimistic perspective too, which insists on the universal and generous welfare state's ability to protect against the potentially detrimental effects of immigration, concurs that this hinges on such welfare states' future ability to actually include also migrants (Banting & Kymlicka 2006: 42-43) . On this, all the perspectives are in agreement; the disagreement concerns the ability of the generous welfare state and/or multicultural policies to achieve this aim.
None of the four perspectives introduced at the start of this paper pay much attention to welfare policy change. However, this historical analysis of the Scandinavian welfare states' approach to immigration demonstrates that Scandinavian policy on the integration of immigrants has changed quite considerably in the decades since the advent of the new post-war immigration. While maintaining a common grounding in the Nordic welfare model, the three countries have gone through a process of divergence, in the sense of adopting different approaches to integration and multiculturalism -institutionally and ideologically. In the past 20 years however, we also see a process of convergence in this field. The logic of the active welfare state is entering the realm of integration policy in all three countries, although there is still considerable variation -particularly in the degree to which they have made access to citizenship dependent on performance.
To understand the different routes the push for change has taken in Scandinavia, the country-specific party political constellations -the role of the right in particular -should be taken into account. Growing support for right-wing parties is in the migration/welfare state literature often taken as a sign of welfare state roll-back (Alesina & Glaeser 2004: 177) . However, in the Scandinavian context it is essential to note that the radical right can be in favour of considerable levels of social spending. As such these parties are not necessarily antiwelfare, but promote different policies for the distribution of welfare -including cutting down on the spending that directly benefits migrants 
Notes

1
Taylor-Gooby (2005) makes a similar point.
2
The 24-year age threshold for transnational marriages means that family unification between youth settled in Denmark and foreign residents can only take place if both parties have reached 24 years of age. The idea is that people will be more vulnerable to possible pressure from parents and family to marry, and thus more susceptible to accept an arranged transnational marriage, when they are younger. As they grow older and gain more education, and financial and emotional independence, they will be more able to resist such pressure. In a later memorandum to the Council of Europe's commissioner for human rights, the Government also states that the rule promotes "better integration, because it contributes to improved educational and work opportunities for young people" (see Hagelund 2008) .
3 In Norway means-tested social assistance is organised and funded by municipalities, while rights-based income support is funded directly by the state. For local authorities it is thus better to have residents on, for example, state-funded unemployment benefits than on social assistance.
4
An extension to 600 hours will probably be approved shortly. ' Journal of Social Policy, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 661-772. Walzer, M 1983, Spheres of justice, Basic Books, New York. 
